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1. Introduction 
The financial reporting quality issue has received repeated scrutiny in the wake of recent financial 
scandals and the collapse of high-profile institutions like Enron and WorldCom (Hong and 
Anderson, 2011). Due to these recent financial crises, as well as the audit failure in not detecting 
and preventing such behaviour, the accounting profession is experiencing a credibility crisis 
(Krishnan, 2005). The collapses of well-respected companies, according to Leventis and 
Dimitropoulos (2012) resulted in investors losing confidence in both corporate disclosure and 
capital market efficiency as they have "raised many concerns about the reliability of financial 
reporting and the efficiency of existing monitoring mechanisms" (Leventis and Dimitropoulos, 
2012, p. 161). As a result, a number of regulations, including e.g. Sarbanes-Oxley Act have been 
developed in an attempt to limit the discretion of managers, regain public trust in financial 
reporting and ultimately improve accounting quality (Di Martino et. al., 2017). 
The quality of financial information can be assessed by, amongst other things, the incidence of 
earnings management (Elias, 2012). For example, Barth et al. (2008), Chen et al. (2011), Zeghal 
et al. (2012) and Ahmed et al. (2013) all used earnings management as a proxy to test for 
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accounting quality. The literature provides convincing evidence that the occurrence of earnings 
management works to the detriment of financial reporting quality. Earnings management reduces 
the reliability of financial information, which, in turn, lowers the quality of financial reporting 
(Ascioglu et al., 2012: Habbash et al., 2013). 
Thus, the correlation between financial reporting quality and earnings management can be clearly 
stated as, ceteris paribus, the less the incidence of earnings management, the higher the quality of 
financial reporting.  
 The literature on how a researcher can detect earnings management is predominantly revolved 
around quantitative methods by which such practice can be measured although applying the 
quantitative approach requires a significant amount of data and work.  Nevertheless, the existence 
of earnings management practices within the banking industry has been documented in the 
Western literature (Bornemann et al., 2012).  However, earnings management related literature on 
developing countries, including Libya, is severely limited. In fact, there is a general paucity of 
research on financial reporting quality in Libya altogether (Zakari and Menacere, 2012; Sawan and 
Alsaqqa, 2013; Sawan and Alzeban, 2015, Barghathi et al., 2017a).  
Given the paucity of relevant data in the Libyan context, this paper tests for earnings management, 
by Libyan Commercial Banks’ (LCBs) managers, by deploying a different technique i.e. the 
qualitative approach. The qualitative approach has been widely adopted by academics to test for 
the existence of earnings management and, therefore, could be called the academic approach. In 
this approach, as will be discussed later, the research engages directly with the involved 
stakeholders, in order to examine perceptions of the existence of earnings management.  
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The paper is structured as follows: the next section provides a background for the study. This is 
followed by Section 3 that reports on the literature review on earnings management detection.  
Thereafter, Section 4 describes the research design. Research findings are then discussed in Section 
5. And finally, Section 6 will summarize the research and provide discussion.  
2. Background  
Financial reporting regulations have an important role to play in this area. The IASB as a regulatory 
body, for example, affirms that the main objective of financial statements is the provision of useful 
financial information and it is making every effort to reduce flexibility in standards to restrict 
earnings management practices (Cotter, 2012). Accounting standards, according to Zhang et al. 
(2013), affect the level of earnings management e.g. they will determine the degree of managerial 
discretion with regard to revenue and loss recognition. International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) have been mainly developed in order to converge accounting information globally. 
However, the introduction of IFRS is attracting scholars to investigate their effect on accounting 
quality and, therefore, on earnings management (Zhang et al., 2013). In Libya, accounting 
practices are mainly influenced by regulatory factors and regulations (Shariea 2014). 
Most of the LCBs are listed on the Libyan Stock Market (LSM) and, therefore, affected by LSM 
regulation.  This requires that listed companies must prepare their financial statements in 
compliance with IFRS and requires that these statements have to be audited in accordance with 
International Auditing Standards (Kribat, 2009). However, it can easily be identified that 
IFRS/IAS is not applied by LCBs, although some claim that the accounts are being prepared 
accordingly (Barghathi et. al., 2017a). The LSM also requires listed companies to submit quarterly, 
semi-annual, and annual reports and to publish a summary of the financial position of the company 
in two local newspapers, one of which, in Arabic, must appear within one week of being approved 
4 
 
by a general meeting (Article 23). Although companies are encouraged to list on the LSM, only 
13 companies are listed and traded in the LSM1, at the time of writing, including seven commercial 
banks. Article 75 grants listed companies that have at least 60 days of share trading during the year 
the following advantages: (i) tax relief from income tax for five years; thereafter 50% relief as 
long as the company is still listed; and (ii) 50% relief on custom and stamp duties.   
Corporate governance, defined as “the system by which companies are directed and controlled” 
(Cadbury, 1992), also has a key role to play in establishing the culture within which financial 
reporting takes place. Prior research indicates that good corporate governance could have an 
influential impact on earnings management; audit committees, for example, “can oversee internal 
control for financial reporting and the quality of financial information” (Man and Wong, 2013, p. 
409). Good corporate governance, in general, can reduce the adverse effect of earnings 
management on the quality of financial reporting which, in turn, helps in improving investors’ 
confidence (Uadiale, 2012). More clearly, in the U.S. for example, good corporate governance 
means the “ability to mitigate listed companies earnings management activities” (Yang et al., 2012, 
p. 89). It is worth mentioning that a corporate governance code for commercial banks has been 
issued by the Central Bank of Libya and all commercial banks operating in Libya have to adhere 
to this code. This code was issued in 2006 based on OECD principles of corporate governance as 
well as the Basel Report on banking supervision for enhancing corporate governance for banking 
organisations with the aim to protect both shareholders and stakeholders (Zagoub, 2011). The next 
section reports and summarises the literature on the different methods by which the existence of 
earnings management can assessed. 
                                                 
1 Listed companies can be viewed at http://www.lsm.ly. 
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3. Literature review 
A clearer understanding of earnings management requires knowledge on how to detect it. The 
literature reports on the two broad approaches, quantitative and qualitative, by which earnings 
management can be assessed.   
3.1 Quantitative Approach (Discretionary Accruals Identification) 
 
The quantitative approach is mainly based on identifying discretionary accruals. Accruals can be 
measured as the difference between net income and cash from operations (Yang et al., 2012). 
Fundamentally, most earnings management activities are based on accruals because of their central 
role in accounting decisions. For example, selling on credit requires the creation of an accrual since 
the sale is recognized in the income statement accompanied by an accounts receivable, which is 
accrued in the balance sheet until the cash is received. Also, accruals are used as a basic principle2, 
i.e. this matching is done in order to obtain a better measure of periodic economic performance 
than is provided by cash flows (Mohanram, 2003). In the same context, Sun and Rath (2011) 
suggest: 
“Fundamentally, more management discretions are often made through accruals. 
More accruals are in place simply because the accounting system creates accruals in 
order to recognize revenues when they are earned and match expenses to those 
revenues, irrespective of whether cash has been received or paid. This matching 
principle makes accounting earnings a better economic measure of firm performance 
than cash flows” (p. 128). 
Accruals can be divided into two components; discretionary and nondiscretionary. Discretionary 
accruals are recognised as abnormal or managed accruals and are always connected to earnings 
manipulation. On the other hand, nondiscretionary accruals are recognised as normal or 
unmanaged accruals. (Kang and Sivaramakrishnan, 1995; Peasnell et al. 2000). Moreover, accrual 
                                                 
2 IAS 1 requires the accrual basis for financial reporting purposes. 
6 
 
accounting as a means to manage earnings seems to be the preferred option for management, as 
accruals are difficult to observe compared to earnings management practised through real 
transactions (Young, 1999).  
Sun and Rath (2011) suggest that it is easier for researchers to test for managing earnings through 
accounting choices rather than through real transactions.  
Given the flexibility offered by GAAP, managers could manage earnings by choosing from 
alternative accounting methods within GAAP or by applying these methods in particular ways e.g. 
changing estimates of assets’ lives. The former may be noticeable and thereby be spotted by the 
auditor. However, the latter could be a bit harder for an auditor to observe (at least in terms of 
motives) (Schipper, 1989). In this regard, Dechow (1994) blames the flexibility offered by GAAP 
for giving the opportunity to managers for earnings management. 
Young (1999) considered testing for earnings management as a central issue in financial statement 
analysis. He added that managers are provided with a series of earnings management techniques 
that range from real operating decisions such as asset sales and changes in R&D expenses to 
financial reporting decisions such as accounting method changes and accrual choices. The latter, 
accruals choices, according to Young (1999), is a less costly mechanism that can be used to 
manipulate earnings. 
Empirical studies for testing for the existence of earnings management mainly focus on the 
discretionary part of accruals by testing the discretionary components of reported earnings 
(Dechow et al., 1995). According to McNichols (2000), one of the fundamental issues of earnings 
management testing is measuring management’s discretion in influencing reported earnings. In 
this regard, Stolowy and Breton (2004) argue that “[a]s profit differs from cash flow by the total 
of accruals, manipulation of the profit figure implies manipulation of the accruals” (p. 22). They 
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also added that distinguishing between normal and abnormal accruals represents a challenge that 
researchers face (Stolowy and Breton, 2004). Separating out the discretionary and non-
discretionary elements of accruals has been described by Mohanram (2003) as a “critical aspect” 
to measure for earnings management. 
In the quantitative approach for earnings management detection, McNichols (2000) provided an 
overview of three techniques by which earnings management can be tested based on discretionary 
accruals namely; aggregate accruals, specific accruals, and earnings distribution after earnings 
management. However, the discussion of which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
3.2 Qualitative Approach (Academic Approach) 
 
In addition to the above approach to identifying earnings management, a second approach could 
be followed to test for earnings management. Researchers may resort to survey opinions of related 
parties to assess their perceptions of whether earnings are being managed. 
The literature shows that researchers have carried out surveys to elicit professionals’ perceptions 
of earnings management. These include Baralexis (2004), who claims that adopting this approach 
enables researchers to conclude real “not hypothesized” motives behind such activity. Nelson et 
al. (2002) used a field-based questionnaire to elicit auditors’ recollections of specific managers’ 
attempts to manage earnings. They claimed that this approach provides transaction-level data on 
earnings management attempts and their consequences on auditors’ decisions. The accuracy of 
recollections is important, but cannot always be relied upon in field-based questionnaire. However, 
techniques have been developed to tackle the fallibility of human memory e.g. eliciting simple 
facts concerning recent events rather than asking leading questions or eliciting details of old events. 
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Also, an accurate recall could be encouraged by emphasizing the importance of the research and 
affirming the anonymity of responses (Nelson et al. 2002).  
Baralexis (2004) based his study on a questionnaire to survey 100 experienced auditors and 100 
experienced accountants. The questionnaire was designed with close reference to the relevant 
literature and consisted of eight questions exploring creative accounting in Greece. 
Similar to Baralexis’s work, Noronha et al. (2008) explored earnings management in China. They 
surveyed 11 accrual-earnings management techniques that might be used by Chinese companies. 
The questionnaire was distributed to 1400 companies. Their results indicated that earnings 
management is pervasive in China and that managers consider earnings management as reasonable 
and useful. Noronha et al. (2008) concluded that the prime incentive for earnings management in 
China is management promotion and compensation, which is inconsistent with prior literature that 
suggests that capital market pressure is the most important motivation for earnings management. 
Another study which followed this approach was by Al-khabash and Al-Thuneibat (2009). Their 
study aimed at providing evidence on earnings management existence from the perspective of 
external and internal auditors in Jordan. A specially designed questionnaire was used. Their sample 
consisted of 61 internal auditors and 66 external auditors. The results were summarized as 
suggesting that external auditors believe that managers are involved in earnings management to 
increase and decrease income while internal auditors believe that managers are involved in 
earnings management to only increase income. 
This paper adopts this qualitative approach to examine whether earnings management is being 
practiced by LCBs’ managers. A questionnaire is used to elicit stakeholders’ perceptions regarding 
the quality of LCBs’ financial reporting as well as their views concerning the existence of earnings 
9 
 
management. Their perceptions are also sought for whether LCBs’ accountability has been 
discharged properly to shareholders as well as other stakeholders. Therefore, the paper tries to 
answer the following main research questions: 
RQ1: How do LCBs’ stakeholders perceive the quality of financial reporting of LCBs? 
RQ2: To what extent, do LCBs’ stakeholders think that earnings management is practiced by 
LCBs’ managers? 
RQ3: To what extent do LCBs’ stakeholders think that LCBs’ managers are accountable? 
4. Research Design and Structure 
As discussed and explained earlier, the qualitative approach was adopted to satisfy the research 
objectives of this paper; in particular a questionnaire survey was chosen as the means of data 
collection. A questionnaire survey is one of the most widely used methods in social science 
research (Blaxter et al., 2010), and, according to Sekaran (1992), it is an efficient method for data 
collection where it is reasonably clear to the researcher what information is required. 
In total 193 questionnaires were distributed and collected personally. Questionnaires were attached 
to a covering letter stating the purpose of the study and encouraging participants to take part; it 
also identified the researcher and assured the anonymity and confidentiality of any information 
which respondents would provide. 
Once questionnaires started to come back, the process of coding and keying them into an Excel 
spreadsheet was started. After feeding all the responses into the spreadsheet, a double check was 
made to ensure that all responses had been correctly entered.  Table 1 summarizes the number of 
returned questionnaires categorized by different stakeholders. 
Table 1: The Returned Questionnaires 
Respondent Groups Distributed Questionnaires 
Returned 
Questionnaires Response Rate 
Preparers 56 27 48% 
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Auditors  54 27 50% 
Regulators 31 20 64% 
Users  52 28 54% 
Total 193 102 53% 
Note: this table shows the numbers of distributed and returned questionnaires, as well as the response rate according 
to each group. More details about the personal information of the respondents are presented in Table 2. 
The questionnaire was designed to be answered by all stakeholders who, for the analysis process, 
were categorized into four groups: Preparers, Auditors, Regulators, and Users (see Table 1). 
Once the responses were coded into an Excel spreadsheet as discussed earlier, the data was 
transferred to the SPSS statistical package for analysis. This study focuses on different 
stakeholders’ perceptions regarding the earnings management practices in Libyan Commercial 
Banks; for this purpose, most questions were designed based on a five-point Likert scale which 
involves using non-parametric statistical tests due to the ordinal nature of the qualitative data 
(Saunders et al., 2012). In particular, this study uses the Kruskal-Wallis (KW) and Mann-Whitney 
(MW) tests. The KW test is used to identify whether any significant difference exists among the 
perceptions of the groups; if so, an MW test is carried out to determine which pairs of groups show 
significantly different perceptions. For further illustration, descriptive statistics, means and 
standard deviations3, were also calculated to provide more insightful pictures of the perceptions. 
 5. Research findings 
5.1 Personal Background of the Respondents 
The first part of the questionnaire deals with general personal information about the respondents. 
This part’s questions dealt with respondents’ age, gender, professional qualification as well as their 
education and where it took place. It also sought information about experience that a respondent 
                                                 
3 Means and standard deviations are, strictly speaking, not appropriate as measures of ordinal data, but their use is 
widespread and they arguably have reasonable information content subject to assumptions made about the intervals 
in the ordinal data. 
11 
 
might have had within the banking sector. Table 2 summarises the personal information about the 
respondents corresponding to their groups. 
The total proportions of each individual group (Preparers, Auditors, Regulators, and Users) are 
26.5%, 26.5%, 19.6%, and 27.5% respectively; most are male (90 out of 102 or 88.2%). Twenty 
eight (27.5%) are professionally qualified, mainly being members of the Libyan Accountants and 
Auditors Association (LAAA) (24 or 23.5%). Ninety (88.2%) of the respondents have an academic 
qualification higher than a Diploma which suggests a good basic knowledge of financial issues. 
Most importantly, 78 (76.5%) of the respondents have indicated that they have banking experience 
which again gives a reasonable level of assurance as regards to obtaining informed views about 
Libyan commercial banks  (LCBs). 
Table 2: Respondents’ Personal Information 
Statement Category 
Groups 
Preparers Auditors Regulators Users 
 %  %  %  % 
Age 
Less than 25 1 3.7       
26-30 3 11.1   2 10.0 11 39.3 
31-40 15 55.6 5 18.5 8 40.0 10 35.7 
41-50 4 14.8 11 40.7 9 45.0 7 25.0 
Over 50 4 14.8 11 40.7 1 5.0   
Total 27 100 27 100 20 100 28 100 
Gender 
Male 26 96.3 25 92.6 20 100 19 67.9 
Female 1 3.7 2 7.4   9 32.1 
Total 27 100 27 100 20 100 28 100 
Professional 
Qualification 
LAAA 6 22.2 12 44.4 1 5.0 5 17.9 
ACCA 3 11.1       
AICPA   1 3.7     
ICAEW         
CIMA         
Others 1        
Total 10 37.0 13 48.1 1 5.0 5 17.9 
Education 
PhD   6 22.2   3 10.7 
Master 2 7.4   4 20.0 7 25.0 
Bachelor 20 74.1 19 70.4 14 70.0 15 53.6 
Diploma 3 11.1 1 3.7 1 5.0 3 10.7 
Other  1 3.7 1 3.7 1 5.0   
Total 26 96.3 27 100 20 100 28 100 
Location of 
highest 
qualification 
Libya 23 85.2 20 74.1 19 95.0 25 89.3 
Other Arab country 1 3.7 5 18.5   2 7.1 
UK 2 7.4 1 3.7 1 5.0 1 3.6 
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USA 1 3.7 1 3.7     
Other          
Total 27 100 27 100 20 100 28 100 
Place of Work 
Commercial Bank 27        
Central Bank of Libya     14 65.0   
Libyan Stock Market     3 20.0   
Tax Authority     3 15.0   
Audit firm   19 70.3     
State Audit   8 29.6     
Academic       15 53.6 
Others       13 46.4 
Total 27 100 27 100 20 100 28 100 
Banking 
Experience 
Less 5 years 9 33.3 15 55.6 3 15.0 24 85.7 
5-10 8 29.6 2 7.4 7 35.0 1 3.6 
11-15 3 11.1 2 7.4 4 20.0 2 7.1 
Over 15 7 25.9 8 29.6 6 30.0 1 3.6 
Total 27 100 27 100 20 100 28 100 
Note: LAAA = Libyan Accountants and Auditors Association, ACCA = Association of Chartered Certified 
Accountants, AICPA = American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, ICAEW = Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales, and CIMA = Chartered Institute of Management Accountants. 
 
5.2 The Quality of Financial Reporting and Earnings Management 
The objective of this section is to report the respondents’ perceptions about the quality of financial 
reporting in Libya, as well as their awareness of earnings management. First of all, it asks about 
the implications of earnings management in relation to the quality of financial statements. Then 
four questions are asked to investigate whether there is a difference between private and public 
banks, and between listed and unlisted banks in terms of the application of earnings management. 
Afterwards, perceptions of the underlying reasons of why bank managers would engage in 
earnings management are investigated. Table 3 (Panel A) presents the responses relating to these 
questions 
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Table 3: Stakeholders’ Perceptions about the Practice of, and Motivations for, Earnings 
Management 
Panel A: K-W test 
Q Statement N Mean SD 
Group Means K-W 
P-value PR AD RG US 
1.1 
Earnings management affects the 
quality of financial statements 
99 3.96 .768 3.81 4.00 3.94 4.07 .734 
1.2 
Earnings management is practiced by 
private listed banks 
98 3.35 .932 3.62 3.19 3.44 3.18 .101 
1.3 
Earnings management is practiced by 
private unlisted banks 
97 3.31 .755 3.32 3.38 3.33 3.21 .822 
1.4 
Earnings management is practiced by 
public listed banks 
94 3.11 .861 3.00 3.04 3.31 3.14 .622 
1.5 
Earnings management is practiced by 
public unlisted banks 
93 3.01 .787 2.84 2.87 3.17 3.19 .331 
1.6 
Managers exercise earnings 
management to manipulate information 
communicated to shareholders 
96 3.02 1.036 2.62 3.15 3.11 3.23 .166 
1.7 
Managers exercise earnings 
management for their own benefits 
98 3.16 1.012 2.73 3.12 3.56 3.36 .058 
1.8 
Earnings management enables 
managers to better communicate 
economic information to stakeholders 
97 2.74 1.044 2.65 2.76 3.06 2.61 .526 
1.9 
Managers exercise earnings 
management to manipulate information 
to regulators 
97 3.22 1.033 3.04 2.96 3.39 3.50 .201 
1.10 
Managers exercise earnings 
management to manipulate information 
communicated to credit rating agencies 
97 3.19 1.024 3.08 3.00 3.39 3.33 .524 
Note: This table shows the mean and standard deviation (SD) for all respondents regarding questions about various 
issues related to earnings management. It also provides the mean for each group and the p-value for the Kruskal-
Wallis (K-W) test. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), and users (US) for each 
question. A * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly agree”. 
 
Stakeholders expressed a broad level of agreement, based on their mean scores, on the first four 
issues (Q 1.1- 1.4). All stakeholders agreed, in aggregate, that earnings management practices 
affect the quality of financial statements; they also showed similar scores regarding the practice of 
earnings management by private banks; they perceived that earnings management is practiced by 
private banks no matter whether they are listed or unlisted. Earnings management is also perceived 
by each stakeholder group to be practiced by public listed banks. Unlisted banks are, in aggregate, 
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only perceived by the Preparer and Auditor groups not to be engaged in earnings management 
practices; this may suggest that from the viewpoint of these two groups there is an influence by 
the Libyan Stock Market on the public banks.  
The other two groups (Regulators and Users) seem to perceive that earnings management is 
practiced by public banks regardless of whether they are listed or not. That is similar to their views 
regarding private banks. Some underlying reasons as to why bank managers may be involved in 
earnings management practices are discussed in the remaining six questions of Table 3 (Panel A 
and B).  Questions as to whether bank managers exercise earnings management practices to 
mislead or satisfy shareholders or for their own benefits show different perceptions between the 
Preparers group and other groups. While Preparers tend to believe, on average, that bank managers 
do not engage in earnings management to either affect the shareholders or for their own benefit, 
other groups think that bank managers exercise earnings management for these reasons. This result 
suggests that, from the viewpoint of Auditors, Regulators, and Users, bank managers are involved 
in what is called “opportunistic earnings management” where managers engage in earnings 
management for their own benefit. The other type of earnings management is “informative 
earnings management” where bank managers manage earnings so as to better communicate the 
economic and financial situation of the bank. Notably, only the Regulators group think, on average, 
that this type of earnings management is practiced by the bank managers while other groups’ mean 
scores are at the mid-point suggesting that, on balance, they do not think that this type of earnings 
management exists within Libyan Commercial Banks. Whether earnings management does exist 
to affect the information communicated to regulators is only doubted by the Auditors group 
although their mean score is very close to the mid-point (2.96). However, other groups’ mean 
scores are over 3.00 confirming that, there is, on balance, a perception that earnings management 
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could be practiced to send misleading information to regulators. Lastly, all groups agreed, on 
balance, that earnings management is practiced in order to affect the bank rankings supplied by 
the credit rating agencies. 
Although the Kruskal-Wallis test does not show any significant differences between the 
stakeholder groups, the Mann-Whitney test results in Table 3 (Panel B) show that there are three 
significant differences; the first two are between the Preparers and Users groups, the third is 
between the Preparers and Regulators groups. Preparers and Users show a significant difference 
in views regarding the practicing of earnings management by private listed banks. Although both 
groups think, on average, that private listed banks are engaged in earnings management, the 
Preparers’ mean score is slightly higher than that of Users: 3.62 and 3.18 respectively. Also, the 
Preparers group thinks that earnings management is not practiced to influence the shareholders; 
by contrast, the Users group believes that earnings management is practiced for such a reason. This 
result clearly refers to the existence of a trust issue between the Preparers and some other groups. 
The second significant difference occurred between the responses of the Preparers and Regulators 
groups; while the former think, on balance, that opportunistic earnings management does not exist, 
Regulators think, on average, that this type of earnings management does exist giving further 
evidence of a significant disagreement that refers to trust; this conflict has implications for the 
extent to which accountability can be seen to exist.  
Table 3: Stakeholders’ Perceptions about the Practice of, and Motivations for, Earnings 
Management 
Panel B: M-W test 
Q Statement K-W P-values 
M-W p-values 
PR-AD PR-RG PR-US AD-RG AD-US RG-US 
1.1 
Earnings management affect the 
quality of financial statements 
.734 .497 .426 .360 .788 .788 .821 
1.2 
Earnings management is practiced by 
private listed banks 
.101 .073 .548 .038* .193 .848 .120 
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1.3 
Earnings management is practiced by 
private unlisted banks 
.822 .915 .964 .544 1.000 .386 .472 
1.4 
Earnings management is practiced by 
public listed banks 
.622 .872 .296 .602 .257 .773 .323 
1.5 
Earnings management is practiced by 
public unlisted banks 
.331 .852 .249 .186 .177 .174 1.000 
1.6 
Managers exercise earnings 
management to manipulate 
information communicated to 
shareholders 
.166 .095 .114 .045* .965 .717 .686 
1.7 
Managers exercise earnings 
management for their own benefits 
.058 .240 .015* .053 .096 .426 .373 
1.8 
Earnings management enables 
managers to better communicate 
economic information to stakeholders 
.526 .721 .242 .850 .447 .540 .153 
1.9 
Managers exercise earnings 
management to manipulate 
information to third party regulators 
.201 .749 .337 .158 .152 .056 .721 
1.10 
Managers exercise earnings 
management to manipulate 
information communicated to credit 
rating agencies 
.524 .746 .404 .460 .219 .240 .833 
Note: This table shows the p-values produced by M-W test between the different groups regarding questions about 
different issues related to earnings management. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators 
(RG), and users (US) for each question. A * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly agree”. 
 
It is worth noting here that the thinking behind asking the four questions, 1.2 - 1.5, is to examine 
the effect, if any, of the LSM’s requirements on financial reporting quality. It may be assumed that 
such requirements may put pressure on LCBs’ managers to produce a financial report in a certain 
way. It may also be reasoned, based on such requirements, that managers of listed LCBs are held 
more accountable relative to their unlisted LCBs counterparts. However, the results, as reported 
above, showed, on average, a perception that the LSM had a slight impact on LCBs’ financial 
reporting.  
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5.3 Perceptions about Factors that may Enable Earnings Management Practices 
This section investigates factors that might give bank managers the opportunity to manage 
earnings, in other words, factors that influence financial reporting quality. Stakeholders groups 
were asked to express their agreement or disagreement regarding a set of nine factors. In order to 
identify any differences in views regarding these factors a KW test was performed. The test results 
are displayed in Table 4 (Panel A). 
Table 4: Potential Factors that may Enable Bank Managers to Practice Earnings 
Management  
Panel A: K-W test 
Q Statement N Mean SD 
Group Means K-W 
P-value PR AD RG US 
2.1 Local accounting practices 96 3.56 .904 3.71 3.48 3.84 3.32 .310 
2.2 Ineffective external audit function 99 3.83 .904 3.64 3.78 4.05 3.89 .510 
2.3 Poor corporate governance mechanism 99 3.91 .809 3.84 3.89 4.05 3.89 .888 
2.4 
Poor commercial and business 
knowledge of users 
97 3.86 .829 3.64 4.00 3.89 3.89 .471 
2.5 Ineffective monitoring by CBL 98 3.84 .870 3.68 3.93 3.83 3.89 .751 
2.6 Ineffective monitoring by LSM 99 3.80 .869 3.76 3.74 3.79 3.89 .789 
2.7 
Ineffective monitoring by Tax 
authority 
98 3.76 .897 3.67 3.81 3.89 3.68 .820 
2.8 Difficulty of detection by auditors 98 3.54 1.007 3.37 3.56 3.68 3.57 .761 
2.9 Difficulty of detection by users 99 3.67 .904 3.36 3.78 3.74 3.79 .380 
Note: This table shows the mean and standard deviation (SD) for all respondents regarding questions about the factors 
may open the door for bank managers to be engaged in earnings management practices. It also provides the mean for 
each group and the p-value for the Kruskal-Wallis (K-W) test. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), 
regulators (RG), and users (US) for each question. The bold figure indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly agree”. 
 
All stakeholders groups were, on average, in agreement that the above factors could have enabled 
bank managers to manage earnings. Focusing on the average of responses, the results indicate that 
all factors were considered by respondents to have the potential to influence earnings management 
practices given the recorded mean values significantly over the mid-point. It is worth mentioning 
that the term “local accounting practices” does not refer to Libyan accounting standards; rather it 
refers to the current accounting practices that are accepted by local practitioners.  
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The lack of good corporate governance has been ranked as the factor that most assists in opening 
the door for bank managers to engage in earnings management practices; it was associated with 
the highest mean score of 3.91. On the other hand, the difficulty in detecting earnings management 
practices by external auditors was given the lowest mean score of 3.54. 
To investigate whether there were significant differences in the views expressed, six MW tests 
were conducted and the results are summarized in Table 4 (Panel B). 
Table 4: Potential Factors that may Enable Bank Managers to Practice Earnings 
Management  
Panel B: M-W test 
Q Statement K-W P-values 
M-W p-values 
PR-AD PR-RG PR-US AD-RG AD-US RG-US 
2.1 Local accounting practices .310 .369 .569 .243 .130 .643 .126 
2.2 Ineffective external audit function .510 .719 .228 .296 .306 .390 .956 
2.3 
Poor corporate governance 
mechanism 
.888 .821 .557 .838 .370 .738 .774 
2.4 
Poor commercial and business 
knowledge of users 
.471 .119 .310 .254 .585 .739 .552 
2.5 Ineffective monitoring by CBL .751 .300 .563 .351 .879 .925 .841 
2.6 Ineffective monitoring by LSM .789 .933 .841 .407 .766 .329 .667 
2.7 
Ineffective monitoring by Tax 
authority 
.820 .589 .394 .913 .567 .745 .526 
2.8 Difficulty of detection by auditors .761 .721 .349 .383 .531 .671 .917 
2.9 Difficulty of detection by users .380 .136 .227 .137 .972 .806 .786 
Note: This table shows the p-values produced by M-W test between the different groups regarding questions about 
the factors may open the door for bank managers to be engaged in earnings management practices. Groups are defined 
as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), and users (US) for each question. The bold figure indicates 
significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly agree”. 
 
The MW tests results revealed no significant difference among the stakeholders groups. This was 
expected from an analysis of the mean scores of each group which showed a relatively strong level 
of agreement as the mean scores were well above the mid-point for each group. In other words, 
stakeholder groups acknowledge explicit weaknesses in the accountability process within the 
Libyan Commercial Banks. Such factors, if addressed, would arguably deter bank managers from 
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engaging in earnings management, which then should lead to better quality financial reporting and 
thus an improvement in accountability. For example, stakeholder groups agreed that the local 
accounting practices can play a role in allowing earnings management practices among LCBs 
which may suggest a need to adopt International Accounting Standards (IAS/IFRS). In other 
words, accounting standards may have an important role in the accountability system. Views on 
how earnings management would thus be deterred and financial reporting would be improved, and 
ultimately, accountability enhanced, are examined in the next question (Q. 3). 
5.4 Perceptions about Earnings Management Constraints 
 
Having discussed the factors which may enable bank managers to engage in earnings management, 
this section aimed to identify certain elements that may constrain bank managers from practising 
earnings management. Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement 
regarding certain procedures that if adopted might deter earnings management practices by LCBs. 
The responses to this question (Q 3) are summarized in Table 5 (Panel A). 
Table 5: Earnings Management Constraints 
Panel A: K-W test 
Q Statement N Mean SD 
Group Means K-W 
P-value PR AD RG US 
3.1 Adopting IFRS in practice 99 4.27 .586 4.36 4.00 4.37 4.39 .046* 
3.2 Applying good corporate governance 99 4.28 .607 4.24 4.07 4.37 4.46 .079 
3.3 Educating and training of preparers 98 4.30 .735 4.28 4.04 4.42 4.46 .121 
3.4 Educating and training of auditors 99 4.25 .733 3.92 4.22 4.26 4.57 .025* 
3.5 Educating and training of investors 99 3.88 .884 3.64 3.74 3.79 4.29 .025* 
3.6 Strengthen audit regulation 100 4.41 .552 4.31 4.30 4.32 4.68 .015* 
3.7 
Strengthen oversight of financial 
reporting 
100 4.36 .560 4.27 4.22 4.42 4.54 .100 
Note: This table shows the mean and standard deviation (SD) for all respondents regarding questions about the 
earnings management constraints in the LCBs. It also provides the mean for each group and the p-value for the 
Kruskal-Wallis (K-W) test. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), and users (US) for 
each question. Bold figure indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly agree”. 
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Focusing on the average of the responses by different stakeholder groups, the results indicate a 
relatively strong agreement by all stakeholder groups regarding the potential value of all listed 
constraints since, with the exception of the fifth constraint “educating and training of investors” 
which had a mean score of 3.88, all constraints reported a mean score over 4.00. Table 5 (Panel 
A) shows that what was perceived to be the most important constraint that may have an important 
impact on earnings management practices was the strengthening of audit regulation. 
It is notable that questionnaire respondents are not satisfied with the audit profession itself as their 
mean score of 4.41 (the highest in Table 5, Panel A) is very high. Consistent with the literature, 
Mahmud and Russell (2003), for example, concluded that the Libyan Accountants and Auditors 
Association (LAAA) had failed to achieve its objectives, for example, to establish or participate 
in research, conferences, and seminars or any activity that may have an influence over the 
profession’s development. It had also failed even to regulate itself let alone pursue its responsibility 
towards the public interest. El-Firjani (2010), on the other hand, indicated that: 
“[the accounting profession in Libya] is still in its early stages of developing 
corporate accounting practices and it appears to play no important role in retaining 
external influences on the accounting practices” (p. 208). 
The statements (Q 3.4 and 3.6) reflect the questionnaire respondents’ agreement, on balance, that 
the audit profession in Libya has a lot of work to do, for example, to train auditors and to strengthen 
the profession through regulation. Given the important role of the external auditor in the 
accountability process, these results may reveal serious shortcomings in the current accountability 
system of LCBs as it is acknowledged by respondents that the audit profession is weak and auditors 
need to be trained. 
Table 5 (Panel A) reveals a number of significant differences between stakeholder groups 
regarding the influence of certain constraints in deterring bank managers from being involved in 
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earnings management practices. The overall results of the differences between stakeholder groups 
indicate that, although they agreed on the potential effect of the above-mentioned constraints, there 
were some significant differences among them about the degree of the impact of these constraints. 
To identify which pairs may have different views with respect to these constraints, six Mann-
Whitney tests were conducted and the results are summarized in Table 5 (Panel B). 
Table 5: Earnings Management Constraints 
Panel B: M-W test 
Q Statement 
K-W 
P-values 
M-W p-values 
PR-AD PR-RG PR-US AD-RG AD-US RG-US 
3.1 Adopting IFRS in practice .046* .024* .867 .687 .035* .018* .899 
3.2 
Applying good corporate 
governance 
.079 .364 .550 .116 .122 .024* .421 
3.3 Educating and training of preparers .121 .212 .799 .330 .099 .025* .491 
3.4 Educating and training of auditors .025* .368 .252 .006* .641 .020* .142 
3.5 Educating and training of investors .025* .744 .665 .015* .910 .008* .034* 
3.6 Strengthen audit regulation .015* 1.000 1.000 .006* 1.000 .018* .014* 
3.7 
Strengthen oversight of financial 
reporting 
.100 .952 .347 .053 .299 .048* .361 
Note: This table shows the p-values produced by M-W test between the different groups regarding questions about 
the earnings management constraints in the LCBs. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators 
(RG), and users (US) for each question. Bold figure indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly agree”. 
 
The above table (Panel B) reveals several significant differences between stakeholders groups. 
Most of these differences were between the Auditors and the other groups. For the first point, 
adopting IFRS in practice, the Auditors group has a significantly different viewpoint from all the 
other stakeholder groups. Also, the Preparers and Users groups have three significant differences 
regarding educating and training of auditors, educating and training of investors, and strengthening 
audit regulation. Regulators and Users groups significantly viewed the educating and training of 
investors, and strengthening audit regulation in different ways. 
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5.5 Perceptions Regarding the Accountability of LCBs’ Managers 
This section investigates perceptions as to whom LCBs’ managers are held accountable. The 
rationale behind this question was to examine the extent to which a narrow or wide notion of 
accountability exists in LCBs. The results are presented in Table 6 (Panel A), and show no 
significant differences in perceptions according to a Kruskal-Wallis test performed to investigate 
whether any significant variation occurs between the responses of the various stakeholders groups 
Table 6: Stakeholders’ Perceptions about LCBs’ Accountees 
Panel A: K-W test 
Q Statement N Mean SD Group Means K-W P-value PR AD RG US 
3.1 Shareholders 102 3.94 .818 4.00 4.07 3.90 3.79 .531 
3.2 Employees 102 2.91 1.082 2.78 2.85 2.75 3.21 .343 
3.3 Current and potential customers 101 3.48 .901 3.52 3.56 3.25 3.52 .467 
3.4 Central Bank of Libya 101 4.17 .788 4.26 4.07 4.00 4.29 .592 
3.5 Tax authority 98 3.83 .813 3.84 3.69 3.79 3.96 .325 
3.6 The Libyan Stock Market 100 3.76 .806 3.73 3.81 3.65 3.82 .914 
3.7 Corresponding banks 99 3.63 .803 3.88 3.73 3.50 3.39 .136 
3.8 Bank credit rating agencies 100 3.54 .892 3.56 3.63 3.60 3.39 .734 
3.9 Media 101 3.00 1.020 3.15 3.11 3.10 2.68 .337 
3.10 Academia and research centres 100 2.85 .999 3.04 2.92 2.95 2.54 .284 
3.11 Society as a whole 99 2.84 .987 3.12 2.74 3.00 2.57 .212 
Note: This table shows the mean and standard deviation (SD) for all respondents regarding questions about whom 
bank managers are accountable to. It also provides the mean for each group and the p-value for the Kruskal-Wallis 
(K-W) test. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), and users (US) for each question. 
A * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly agree”. 
 
The results presented in Table 6 (Panel A) reveal a relatively strong level of agreement from the 
questionnaire respondents as to whom the LCBs’ managers are accountable. However, 
questionnaire respondents consider that employees (Q 3.2), academia and research centres (Q 
3.10), and society as a whole (Q 3.11) are, on balance, not considered as LCBs’ accountees with 
the overall mean scores for these accountees being; 2.91, 2.85, and 2.84 respectively. It is notable 
from the mean scores reported in Table 6 (Panel A) that the Users group has a different view in 
regards to whether employees are accountees for LCBs in contrast to the Preparers, Auditors, and 
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Regulators groups who, on average, disagreed with this statement. This may, partially, be due to 
normative ideas held by academics who represent 53% of the Users group.  
Ironically, the Preparers group think of academia and research centres as an accountee for bank 
managers while, on the other hand, the Users group (53% of which are academic) disagree, on 
balance, with that idea (by giving a mean score of 2.54), and so do Auditors and Regulators groups. 
Another area of disagreement appears when society as a whole was suggested as an accountee. 
The Preparers group agreed with this statement while the Auditors and Users groups disagreed. 
It is also notable that the highest mean score of 4.17 in this Table was given to the Central Bank 
of Libya (CBL, Q 3.4). This result suggests a dual role for the CBL in this regard. On one hand, 
they are the owner of the public banks and on the other hand a regulator for both private and public 
banks. This may partially justify the high mean score given which suggests that the CBL is the 
main accountee of LCBs. 
To see whether any two groups have any significant differences in perceptions, six Mann-Whitney 
tests were performed; the results are shown in Table 6 (Panel B). It can be seen that the only 
significant difference exists between the Preparer and User groups despite the fact that both groups 
agree that corresponding4 banks are an accountee. However, one might think that the Users group 
may not have sufficient knowledge and awareness of what “corresponding banks” meant which 
may suggest a disagreement in responses between both groups. 
Table 6: Stakeholders’ Perception about LCBs’ Accountees 
Panel B: M-W test 
Q Statement K-W P-values 
M-W p-values 
PR-AD PR-RG PR-US AD-RG AD-US RG-US 
3.1 Shareholders .531 .991 .419 .269 .369 .214 .842 
3.2 Employees .343 .684 .758 .144 .847 .202 .114 
                                                 
4 “Corresponding banks” is a term used within banking sector when a bank is being offered banking services by 
another bank.  
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3.3 Current and potential customers .467 .915 .161 .863 .188 .956 .244 
3.4 Central Bank of Libya .592 .697 .207 .956 .473 .644 .197 
3.5 Tax authority .325 .344 .575 .549 .691 .084 .188 
3.6 The Libyan Stock Market .914 .917 .739 .773 .625 .871 .488 
3.7 Corresponding banks .136 .524 .094 .039* .344 .172 .638 
3.8 Bank credit rating agencies .734 .855 .888 .464 .992 .335 .386 
3.9 Media .337 .828 .975 .113 .933 .181 .165 
3.10 Academia and research centers .284 .698 .675 .077 .941 .164 .197 
3.11 Society as a whole .212 .170 .598 .060 .506 .450 .168 
Note: This table shows the p-values produced by M-W test between the different groups regarding questions about 
whom bank managers are accountable to. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), and 
users (US) for each question. A * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly agree”. 
 
6. Summary and Discussion 
This paper tries to examine the existence of earnings management practices through a qualitative 
approach, specifically, through the direct interaction with LCBs’ stakeholders i.e. whether they 
think earnings management is being practiced by LCBs’ managers. First, the question about LCBs’ 
financial reporting quality was asked, this was followed by a set of questions on earnings 
management followed by a question on to whom LCBs’ managers are thought to be held 
accountable. 
Earnings management behaviour is viewed as having a place in LCBs’ financial reporting due to 
the existence of a range of factors. Stakeholder groups agreed, on balance, that such behaviour 
does exist because of local accounting practices, weak external audit, and poor corporate 
governance. 
The above discussion leads to the assumption that financial reporting of LCBs implies managed 
earnings, which implies that the quality of LCBs’ financial reporting would have been impaired 
given the existence of the factors that may facilitate such behaviour. This, on one hand, consistent 
with a huge stream literature that confirms the wide existence of earnings management practices. 
25 
 
On the other hand, leads to consideration of the accountability relationship of LCBs.  If earnings 
management affects the quality of financial reporting and ultimately leads to providing biased 
information then LCBs’ managers are not properly held accountable. 
Due to the importance of an accountability system in almost all corporations, in particular those 
which have a wide range of stakeholders, e.g. banks, it is important to seek to remove impairments 
to accountability. The questionnaire results shed light on how, it is thought, by an informed body 
of opinion, accountability could be promoted. Specifically, the role of IFRS, corporate governance, 
and the external auditor were all supported with a slightly greater level of agreement that the latter 
could help in this regard.  
In respect of the impact of adopting the international accounting standards (IFRS), questionnaire 
results showed, on average, agreement amongst LCBs’ various stakeholders that IFRS would 
improve the accountability system of LCBs. Adopting IFRS would, it is thought, improve the 
quality of LCBs. This should, therefore, lead to LCBs’ managers being held more accountable to 
LCBs’ stakeholders. Although LCBs are required to apply IFRS, the current results show a strong 
agreement that IFRS need to be applied in practice. This results consistent with Barghathi et al., 
(2017a) who concluded that in reality IFRS is not applied although LCBs’ managers claim that 
their financial statements are being prepared based on IFRS. Such results should be of interest to 
local regulators to seek ways be which IFRS can be properly applied by LCBs. 
In addition, applying good corporate governance is seen by a range of LCBs’ stakeholders to have 
an influence over the occurrence of earnings management and should therefore promote the quality 
of LCBs’ financial reporting. Applying good corporate governance is, on average, agreed by all 
stakeholders to positively affect the accountability process of LCBs. 
26 
 
As discussed earlier, LCBs adopted a corporate governance framework that has been based on 
both on OECD principles of corporate governance as well as the Basel Report on banking 
supervision in order to protect both shareholders and stakeholders (Zagoub, 2011). However, 
current results clearly refer to a wide agreement that applying good corporate governance is 
required to enhance financial reporting quality. This may refer to either lack of proper application 
of the framework, however, LCB may need to reconsider that. 
The need to provide training to auditors as well as strengthen audit regulation have been agreed 
upon by stakeholders in order to enhance the financial reporting quality and therefore 
accountability. This result clearly refers to the weak audit profession reported in literature, see for 
example Ahmed and Gao (2004), Mahmud and Russell (2003), and Barghathi et al., (2017b). 
The results also indicated to the need for strengthen oversight over the financial reporting. The 
financial reporting of LCBs is currently being monitored by only few institutions including LCB 
and LSM. Based on such a result, local regulator may investigate the need to establish a separate 
body that is concerned with monitoring and controlling the financial reporting by LCBs. Such 
procedure is applied in some developed countries eg. PACOB in the USA and FRC in the UK. 
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